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Abstract
From the 1980s to the present, Hollywood’s major distributors have been
able to redistribute U.S. theatrical attendance to the advantage of their
biggest blockbusters and franchises. At the global scale and during the
same period, Hollywood has been leveraging U.S. foreign power to break
ground in countries that have historically protected and supported their
domestic film culture. For example, Hollywood’s major distributors have
increased their power in such countries as Mexico, Canada, Australia and
South Korea. This paper will analyze a pertinent test case’ for Hollywood’s
global power: China and its film market. Not only does China have a film-
quota policy that restricts the number of theatrical releases that have a
foreign distributor (∼ 20 to 34 films per year), the Communist Party has
helped the Chinese film business grow to have steady film releases and its
own movie star system. Theoretically, China would be a prime example
of a film market that would need to be opened with the assistance of the
U.S. government. Empirically, however, the case of Chinese cinema might
be a curious exception; we can investigate how a political economic strategy
rooted in explicit power is reaching a limit. Hollywood is, potentially with-
out any other option, taking a more friendly, collaborative approach with
China’s censorship rules and its quota and film-production laws.
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1 Introduction
Hollywood has recently been working hard to sell itself to China. The in-
ternational cut of X-Men: Days of Future Past included lengthier scenes set
in Hong Kong. Skyfall, the 2012 James Bond film, has an action sequence
in Shanghai. Looper also has a significant scene in Shanghai, but in the
original script this scene was meant to be filmed in Paris. The change of
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city was one of the conditions of China’s DMG Entertainment, who invested
in the production of Looper (O’Connor & Armstrong, 2015, p.10). DMG
Entertainment was also able to partner with Disney for the Chinese release
of Iron Man 3. The Chinese release of this Marvel blockbuster contained
an extra side-story that was exhibited in no other country. This side-story
breaks from the main plot and has Tony Stark (a.k.a, Iron Man) travel to
China to undergo heart surgery. Tony Stark’s surgeon, Dr. Wu (played by
Chinese star Wang Xueqi), is given screen-time that involves placing a phone
call to Stark’s A.I. assistant J.A.R.V.I.S., having a conversation with another
doctor (played by Fan Bingbing), and pouring a glass of Chinese-brand milk
in an advertisement-like shot (Daniel, 2013; Langfitt, 2015; Tsui, 2013).
Examples of Hollywood trying to appeal to the Chinese film market are
interesting but perhaps not very surprising. The 2016 Theatrical Market
Statistics report, published annually by the Motion Picture Association of
America (M.P.A.A.), lists China as the largest box-office market outside of
the United States (US$ 6.6 billion). Thus, Hollywood’s success in China
could be key to growing the theatrical revenues of its biggest blockbusters
and to helping the media strategies of its parent conglomerates.1
Hollywood’s ambitions make sense, but its recent push into the Chinese
film market is more complicated than it first appears. China has a film quota
policy that restricts the number of theatrical releases that have a foreign
distributor (∼20 to 34 films per year). Moreoever, the Communist Party
actively helped the Chinese film business grow to have steady film releases
and its own movie star system. These circumstances have made it more
difficult for Hollywood to dominate in China, a country with a movie-going
public that is estimated to be over two hundred million people (Curtin, 2007).
The pressure of the M.P.A.A. and the diplomacy of the U.S. government
has not been effective at having China agree to the freer trade of cultural
goods (Jin, 2011; Trumpbour, 2008). Thus, the case of China cinema might
be a curious exception to how Hollywood behaves as a global enterprise,
whereby its biggest blockbusters dominate foreign markets and suffocate na-
tional film production (Song, 2018; Trumpbour, 2008). Hollywood is, po-
tentially without any other option, taking a more friendly, collaborative ap-
proach with China’s censorship rules and its quota and film production laws.
By analyzing the degree to which the Chinese film market is a perti-
1 After China there are the box-office markets of Japan (US$ 2.0 billion), India (US$
1.9 billion) and the U.K. (US$ 1.7 billion) (MPAA, 2016).
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nent“test case” for Hollywood’s global power, this paper functions as an
important bridge between historical analysis and statistical modelling. The
majority of research on the Chinese film market is performed with qualita-
tive methods (Curtin, 2007; Kokas, 2017; Song, 2018; Su, 2011). The rich
historical detail of a qualitative approach is undoubtedly important to under-
standing the Chinese film market, but the pursuit of quantitative research
enables us to study and model trends in the Sino-Hollywood relationship.
For readers more comfortable with quantitative research, this paper might
not be going far enough into the world of economic modelling, as quantitative
evidence is limited to figures and tables that visualize historical trends. Yet,
taking a slower route to building economic models is important in this case, as
any proposed hypothesis should take the time to account for the role of state
and business power in the Chinese film market (Hozic, 2014). Otherwise,
we risk using evidence of Hollywood or Chinese consumer behavior naively,
testing hypotheses that, as conceived, only make sense if economics can be
cleanly separated from politics (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009). For example, Kwak
and Zhang (2011) test the influence of multiple variables on the box-office
performance of foreign films in China. They produce a regression analysis
of box-office performance and identify China-related content, Chinese crew
participation and release timing as significant independent variables. Unfor-
tunately, their evaluation of variables does not fully consider how the results
of a regression–whether positive, negative or weak–are related to political
factors that directly or indirectly influence the distribution of box-office dol-
lars. Consequently, their quantitative approach presumes to test behavior
within a free market, whereby political factors have no observable impact
and consumers cleanly reveal their utility preferences through consumption.
2 The Obstacles in Hollywood’s Way
The place of Hollywood cinema in our conceptions of mass culture makes it
difficult to think that Hollywood’s major studios sometimes struggle for the
dollars of moviegoers. But, like any other business enterprise, Hollywood ex-
periences financial ups and downs, which can be investigated empirically. For
instance, in the U.S. domestic market, the period from 1980 to the present
has been one of the best periods for Hollywood’s major distributors, who
strengthened their grip over the North American theatrical market.2Much of
this recent success has been due to the effect of blockbusters on the overall
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distribution of theatrical revenues and opening-theatre sizes. Partly because
Americans are not seeing more films per year, the major studios have in-
creased the opening-theatre size of its biggest films to better the chances of
Americans saving their “theatre dollars” for the widest-released films (McMa-
hon, 2019).
At the international scale, contemporary Hollywood has been leveraging
U.S. foreign power to make its biggest stars and films global phenomenons,
particularly in countries that do not have the tools to protect or support
their own domestic film culture. Through both the U.S. government’s oppo-
sition to the U.N.E.S.C.O. convention, which aims to “protect and promote
the diversity of cultural expressions,” and the free-trade agreements that re-
move barriers to American film production, Hollywood major distributors
have found political-economic opportunities to dominate the markets of such
countries as Mexico, Canada, Australia and South Korea (Jin, 2011).
In the case of selling its cinema to China, Hollywood has not had the same
opportunity to establish dominance. Hollywood has made entry into the Chi-
nese theatrical market, but gains to its size and strategic position in China
have only come incrementally, through pressure from the U.S. State Depart-
ment and a W.T.O. complaint filed by the United States (case #DS363).
The following subsections outline two key ways the Chinese State is still pro-
tecting its own market from Hollywood domination. Quota policies and state
censorship do not keep Hollywood out of China completely, but they control
and limit the ways foreign film producers and distributors can make money
in China. These “obstacles” in Hollywood’s way have also been giving China
the time and space to build a blockbuster-heavy film industry of its own.
2.1 Quota policies
Quota policies can protect domestic cultural production by setting limits to
the import of foreign cultural products. They also can restrict how much
foreign investment can be involved in domestic cultural production. China is
using quota policies in these two ways. Consequently, Hollywood has access
to Chinese audiences but not in an environment where the biggest American
studios are primarily in control.
2 For an analysis of how the wide-release strategy, in combination with the blockbuster
style and the high concept standard, enabled the major distributors to lower their systemic
risk, see (McMahon, 2019).
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As of 2018, China allows, per year, 34 imported films to have revenue-
sharing deals between Chinese and foreign distributors. This number of 34
is the sum of two “types”. China agreed to 20 film imports per year when
it rejoined the WTO in 2001 (Su, 2011). An additional fourteen “enhanced
format” revenue-sharing films (i.e., 3D) do not count towards this 20-film
commitment, as was agreed by the United States and China in 2012 (WTO,
2012). A revenue-sharing deal must go through a Chinese distributor that
holds a state-sanctioned import license. The Chinese distributor in this deal,
who is almost always the China Film Group (O’Connor & Armstrong, 2015;
Yeh & Davis, 2008), has a percent share of the imported film’s gross revenues.
The current allowance of 34 imported films evolved from Chinese cultural
policy that began in 1994, when China introduced a new revenue-sharing
system for film imports. The first film to be imported through this system
was Warner Bros.’ The Fugitive. From 1994 to 2001, China only allowed
ten revenue-sharing imports per year. While this limit was restrictive, the
handful of Hollywood films that were imported during this period did quite
well; they were sometimes able to collectively claim as much as 70 percent
of China’s box-office revenues per year (Su, 2011). The first version of the
film import system produced debates in China’s academic and cultural cir-
cles about the benefits of China welcoming Hollywood imports. Some film
critics, professors and journalists were not concerned that the majority of
theatrical attendance was going to American films. These commentators
envisioned Hollywood being able to lift Chinese movie attendance overall,
foster cultural liberalism and boost the creative output of Chinese film pro-
duction. The argument against Hollywood’s presence in Chinese theatres
often claimed that an influx of Hollywood films would promote American
individualism, tell superficial stories or fail to admit that there were social
problems in the West. Critics of Hollywood’s influence, such as Li Yiming,
Zheng Dongtian and Dai Jinhua, also argued that it was naive to think that
China’s film industry could be lifted on the wings of Hollywood imports; from
their perspective, the growing influence of American-style of cinema would
weaken the opportunities for Chinese filmmakers to create a distinct national
cinema (Su, 2011).
When China joined the W.T.O. in 2001, the quota limit was doubled,
from 10 to 20 films per year (Su, 2014). For those who were openly critical
of Hollywood’s growing popularity with Chinese moviegoers, this doubling
would clearly have appeared as a bad sign for the future of Chinese cinema
(Su, 2011). However, from a perspective that can analyze what happened
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after China’s W.T.O. entry, we can see how the C.C.P. put Chinese cinema
in a stronger position in the 2000s, despite the increase in foreign imports per
year. In the years before China’s W.T.O. entry, the Chinese government often
funded and promoted the strictly-domestic production of “Main Melody”
films (zhuxuanlu), which were meant to promote “patriotism, socialism and
collectivism” (Su, 2014). “Main Melody” films continued to be produced
from the year 2000 onwards, but in the 1990s the total output of Chinese
film production was low, and this forced these films to be some of the only
domestic alternatives to Hollywood imports. “Main Melody” films were not
the best alternatives to glossy entertainment, as they were of much lower
production quality than the Hollywood blockbusters of the late 1990s (Wang,
2007).
As summarized by Yeh and Davis, state policy after 2000 created op-
portunities for China to use Hollywood as a “a financial and institutional
instrument” (Yeh & Davis, 2008, p. 40). Changes to cultural policy allowed
foreign investors to fund Chinese film projects, as long as the investor group
partnered with one of China’s state-owned studios (Su, 2014). The biggest
and most influential state-owned studio is China Film Group. China Film
Group is a horizontal and vertical consolidation of technical studios and the
China Film Corporation. The benefit of this consolidation was that China
Film Group’s corporate structure updated its production system for creating
blockbusters, which are more expensive to produce and that rely on state-
of-the-art equipment (Yeh & Davis, 2008).
Foreign interests in Chinese cinema can offer capital and technical know-
how, but the Chinese state has also made it clear that it sets the terms to
foreign partnerships with its domestic film business (Su, 2014). During the
first years of the 2000s, China allowed foreign shares of investment in film
production to reach 49 percent, and allowed foreign ownership of movie the-
atres to reach 75 percent. In 2005, China’s Ministry of Culture and other
ministries issued an edict that pulled foreign ownership in theatres down to
49 percent. This edict also stated that Chinese investors must play the lead-
ing role in all joint venture projects (Su 2014). “Leading role,” according to
a U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report, can mean
“having at least one scene shot in China, casting at least one Chinese ac-
tor and, in general, illustrating positive’ Chinese elements” (O’Connor &
Armstrong, 2015, p. 8).
There is empirical evidence to suggest that strong protectionism gave
China’s film industry the time and space to increase the quantity and quality
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of nationally-produced films. Figure 1 presents the number of films produced
in China per year; where data is missing, estimates are made through linear
trends (see note in Figure 1). As was stated above, China’s output in the
1990s was averaging below one hundred films per year. By contrast, China
produced 140 films in 2003 and 411 national films in 2007. This output
kept increasing, putting China firmly in Diana Crane’s category of “super
producer”3(Crane, 2014). In 2013, for example, a total of 638 films were
produced by the Chinese film industry. Just as importantly, some of the
newer films were of much higher production quality and, when needed, their
stories could be told with better film technology and special effects. A key
reason for this jump in quality was that Chinese producers and directors could
partner with American studios and gain access to filmmaking techniques that
were responsible for the glossy style of Hollywood blockbusters (Fraser, 2015;
O’Connor & Armstrong, 2015).
The quality of Chinese nationally-produced films is difficult to estimate
with available data, but we can create a proxy with measures of popularity.
China’s protectionist policies can control the influx of films but it cannot
prevent Hollywood from selecting blockbusters for export. In fact, a foreign
limit to the number of revenue-sharing films likely motivates Hollywood to
export films that can accumulate greater-than-average revenues with their
stars, special effects and other qualities. Therefore, nationally-produced films
that can rise to the highest ranks of popularity– top ten films per year–have
found ways to win popularity over Hollywood’s big-budget releases.
Figure 2 shows the average number of nationally-produced films in that
country’s national box-office (e.g., average number of Ukrainian films in
Ukraine’s box-office top ten). The average is taken from U.N.E.S.C.O. data
from 2005 to 2017. In Figure 2A, countries are split by continent. Panel B
shows the distribution of the average number of nationally-produced films
across all countries in the dataset. For parts of the globe, such as North
America, Oceania and South America, the results in Figure 2 match our
common ideas of national cinemas being unable to compete at the level of
top-ranking theatrical exhibition. National cinemas may flourish in these re-
gions through other means, but the absences of national films in the top ten
are signs of Hollywood’s global power at the theatrical box-office. National
3 Crane (2014) uses data from 2009 to group countries into four categories: super
producers (> 400 films); major producers (> 100 and < 401); medium producers (> 51
and < 101); and, minor producers (> 25 and < 51).
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Figure 1: Chinese Film Production, 1980-2017
Note: Missing data for China film releases (1971-1973, 1978-1979, 1981-1983,
1988-1989, 1991-1993, 1998) are interpolated as linear trends between adjacent
observations.
Sources: Screen Digest for the film releases of China 1970, 1974-1970, 1980,
1984-1987, 1990, 1994-1997, and 1999-2006; UNESCO UIS Statistics
(data.uis.unesco.org) for 2007-2017.
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films in Europe have been able to take some of the top theatrical spots away
from Hollywood. In Asia and Africa, the spread in the data is largest. Some
countries, such as Algeria, South Africa, Malaysia and Singapore, have virtu-
ally no national films in their respective top ten lists. Other countries, such
as Eritrea, India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, have average counts greater
than seven.
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Continent
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n CHN
A. Average number of national films in national top ten
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
n
0.0
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B. Distribution across all countries in dataset
Figure 2: Box-Office Share, 2005-2017: Average number of
National films in Top-Ten Box-Office Revenues per National Market
Sources: UNESCO UIS Statistics (data.uis.unesco.org) for 2005-2017.
In the case of China, our proxy method can allow us to infer that Chinese
films have qualities to compete with Hollywood in the game of theatrical rev-
enues. Chinese nationally-produced films account for roughly five of China’s
top ten theatrical films per year (4.9). This result puts China above the me-
dian in Asia and higher than Denmark, which has the highest average among
European countries (3.84). There are eighty countries in the U.N.E.S.C.O.
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dataset and only nine have higher averages than China.4
2.2 State censorship
China is not the only country to ban films for their content or demand that
some go through edits and cuts before being approved for exhibition (Hozic,
2014; Lewis, 2013). Yet China might be distinguished for its ability to wield
state censorship with such strength that it can weaken Hollywood’s financial
power. As was established above, China is not trying to close its film market
to Hollywood entirely, especially since joining the W.T.O.. Nevertheless,
China shows no signs of removing state censorship from its toolbox, even at
the cost of straining its relationship with the United States.
From the mouths of the C.C.P., government censorship of cinema in China
is rationalized in nationalist language. This rationalization started in the
early years of the People’s Republic, when all film studios in China were na-
tionalized and cinema was treated as a cultural product that could support
broader social processes with “propaganda and thought work” (xuanchuan
sixiang gongzuo). During this period, the film bureau responsible for oversee-
ing Chinese film production promoted the aesthetic of socialist realism, much
like the Soviet Union (Meyer-Clement, 2017). Fewer directors are using the
style of socialist realism, in part because China has been opened to Holly-
wood cinema, but the C.C.P. maintains its interest in what a film shows and
says to Chinese audiences. A film can be entertaining, and even have some
of the gloss of a Hollywood film, but approval for exhibition in China must
be sought from state censors (formerly the State Administration of Press,
Publication, Radio, Film and Television (S.A.P.P.R.F.T.); as of 2018, the
Propaganda Department of the Central Committee) (Song, 2018).
State censors require that all films in China, both of domestic and foreign
origin, adhere to “the principles of the Chinese Constitution and maintain
social morality” (O’Connor & Armstrong, 2015, p. 9). These standards
are maintained through the prohibition of certain images and scenes that
depict “demons or supernaturalism, crime or any other illicit or illegal actions
within China’s borders, disparagement of the People’s Liberation Army and
police, and anything that could be perceived as anti-China–including merely
damaging Chinese sites or monuments” (O’Connor & Armstrong, 2015, p.
4 They are, in alphabetical order: Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, India, Iran, Japan,
Myanmar, Pakistan and Turkey.
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9). State censors also check that films are always suitable for the broadest
group of moviegoers. China does not have a tiered rating system to allow
older moviegoers to view increasing degrees of sex, profanity and violence.
The Chinese state can ban a film from theatrical exhibition if it is deemed
to offend China’s “general audience” (Langfitt, 2015).
Western news media often covers incidents of the Chinese state censoring
Hollywood films, but its coverage can be superficial. The details of individual
examples are privileged over a broader analysis of what China gains from
repeatedly giving Hollywood studios a hard time over this or that scene.5For
instance, the U.S. government claims China uses its censorship guidelines to
affect the timing of a American film’s release. The U.S. State Department
claims the financial impacts of Pixels and Minions were manipulated this
way, when delays to state approval caused the films to be released in Chinese
theatres two days apart. If “manipulating the timing of a foreign film’s
release is common practice” in China, this is another challenge to scheduling
Hollywood releases (O’Connor & Armstrong, 2015, p. 10). Imported films
are already prohibited from being exhibited during key holidays, such as the
Lunar New Year.
Less-than-ideal clusters of Hollywood releases advantage Chinese films,
which then face less direct competition on their days of release (O’Connor
& Armstrong, 2015). Without open access to the decision-making process of
Chinese state censors, we can only build a proxy to substantiate the claim
that the Chinese state can use censorship to throttle the financial impact
of Hollywood films. Figure 3 helps us confirm, with some certainty, that
domestic and imported films have an inverse relationshipi.e., domestics are
popular when imports are not, and vice versa. Figure 3 uses gross revenue
data to compare 60 Chinese films to 60 Hollywood imports. The figure plots
revenue total of each film on the date of the film’s release in China. Panel
B shows there are some identifiable alternations between the releases of the
largest domestic and imported films.
5 For the sake of space, examples will not be detailed. Hollywood films that have had
difficulty with the S.A.P.P.R.F.T. include: the 2010 remake of The Karate Kid, Life of Pi,
Mission: Impossible III, Pixels, the 2012 remake of Red Dawn, and the 2014 of RoboCop.
For descriptions of what the S.A.P.P.R.F.T. objected to in these films and others, see
(Baldwin & Cooke, 2015; Cieply & Barnes, 2013; Langfitt, 2015; O’Connor & Armstrong,
2015; Rosen, 2006).
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Figure 3: China’s Biggest Theatrical Grosses: 60 Domestics v. 60
Imports
Note: Import data in Panel B are presented as negative numbers for the
purposes of visual clarity. They do not signify costs or net income.
Sources: cbooo.cn/Alltimedomestic for overall gross revenues of the top 60
domestic releases and the top 60 foreign releases in China.
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3 Hollywood’s struggle
So far we have outlined key political economic obstacles that prevent Holly-
wood from entering the Chinese market with ease. We can now analyze the
significance of China’s film market to Hollywood. By making estimates of
China’s future potential in cinema, we can theorize what Hollywood can gain
from acquiring a stronger position in this market. We can also empirically
demonstrate that it is presently difficult for Hollywood’s major studios to ac-
quire this stronger position. This forward-looking analysis from the present
is important, as it mirrors the forward-looking logic of capitalization, which
discounts future expected earnings to present prices (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009).
Moreover, Hollywood’s struggle in China would certainly be a factor in how
capitalists weigh their future expectations of global income from Hollywood
cinema (McMahon, 2015).
China’s theatrical market is big now, but it also has room to grow. When
we account for China’s massive population, we see the potential for the Chi-
nese theatrical market to multiply in size. Figure 4 plots the average annual
attendance per capita of the world’s most populous countries. The average
is taken from attendance data between the years 2005 and 2017. On account
of its population size and the differences in consumerism between its urban
and rural regions, China’s average consumer is still only seeing less than one
theatrical film per year. This movie-going habit is relatively low; China’s
significance to Hollywood has an opportunity to multiply if the country can
grow its movie-going culture to the size of countries like Japan, France and
the United States.
As a way to speculate about the future trends in the Chinese theatrical
market, Figure 5 visualizes data from a M.P.A.A. report that has theatrical
revenue data for groups of Chinese cities. The report uses the “Tier clas-
sification system”, which uses a “variety of population, economic, political
and industrial criteria to distinguish between Tiers. Tier 1 cities are gener-
ally defined as Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, and Guangzhou. Tier
2 cities tend to be provincial capitals. Tier 3 cities tend to be prefecture
capitals. Tier 4 and 5 cities are smaller country cities, with populations of
150,000 or less” (Oxford Economics, 2017). The upward trajectory of Chi-
nese box-office revenue might not continue, but if it does, the crucial point is
that state control of the Chinese film market has protected national interests
up until this point, when Chinese movie businesses are big enough to reap
significant future rewards. The China Film Group is a consolidated firm that
13
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has technical capacity for large-scale production and wide distribution(Yeh &
Davis, 2008). Private film production has been officially legal since 2001 and
is contributing to the growth of national film releases (Meyer-Clement, 2017).
Additionally, some of the biggest Chinese firms, such as Wanda, Baidu, Al-
ibaba and Tencent, have acquired smaller media firms and invested in all
sides of cinema, from production facilities to online streaming (Fraser, 2015).
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Source: Oxford Economics (2017)
When a national competitor is unable to fight Hollywood for the top-
grossing ranks of its own market, Hollywood is content to have its interna-
tional strategies mirror its strategy in the United States. In other words,
Hollywood’s most straightforward strategy is to take what is successful at
home and export it abroad (Fu & Govindaraju, 2010). The undesirable
situation for Hollywood is when it cannot, as in China, nurture a social or-
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der that favours its own interests, whereby its biggest films are at the top
of the revenue pyramid and everything else–smaller budget; niche market;
independent–is on the bottom. The inability for Hollywood to produce a
favourable order in the Chinese market can be seen in two ways: (1) in the
levels of total revenues and (2) in the relatively low predictability of American
box-office successes having success in China.
To identify the problem with the levels of revenues that Hollywood gains
from China, we need to look beyond the performances of individual films,
which is a scale that can make Hollywood look strong–films such as Avatar,
Zootopia and Furious 7 have been smash hits with Chinese moviegoers. A
wider perspective shows there is evidence that Hollywood needs to be much
more dominant in China, especially if this country has the potential to be a
keystone of future international sales. Built with data from the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis (B.E.A.), Figure 6 indicates that Asia’s contribution
to the international revenues of American motion picture firms has been
shrinking in recent years. Panel A shows the annual revenue total of U.S.
motion picture sales outside of the United States (referred in the data as
“services to foreign persons”). Panel B shows the percent distribution of
international revenues across regions. Both panels use the regional categories
already set in the B.E.A. data. The category “Africa, Middle East, Asia and
Pacific” is huge geographically–and less-than-ideal for focusing on China–but
a large majority of the revenues in this category come from Australia, China,
Japan and South Korea.
Assuming that Hollywood’s major studios are responsible for the major-
ity of American film exports, Figure 6 indicates that international revenues
of Hollywood have stagnated for the last ten years. Moreover, Panel B shows
that Europe, historically the largest source of Hollywood’s international rev-
enues, has been declining since the late 1990s. Just as importantly, it is Latin
America that has compensated the most for Europe’s declining share after
2005. The total shares of Canada and Africa, Middle East, Asia and Pacific
have shrunk to sizes they had in the late 1990s.
What is visible in Figure 6 can be connected to Hollywood’s struggle in
China, even if the B.E.A. data is too broad to make any causal claim. Figure
7 can help us see relevant contemporary processes. The figure visualizes the
international revenues of the “Africa, Middle East, Asia and Pacific” cate-
gory, but as a rate of change from a 3-year trailing average. The other series
(thin line) is the annual output of Chinese film production, also visualized
as a rate of change from a 3-year trailing average (absolute numbers are
16
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Figure 6: U.S. Motion Picture Services to Foreign Persons,
International Total
Note: When disaggregated data are available, values for services to foreign
persons by U.S. multinational enterprises through their majority owned foreign
affiliates are motion picture and video industries. For the years when
disaggregated data are unavailable, weighted estimates of the motion picture
and video industries are made from the aggregated values of motion picture and
sound recording industries. The weight of Middle East, Asia and Pacific (0.85)
is the average share of motion picture and video industries, when available.
Sources: B.E.A. International Services data for services to foreign persons by
U.S. multinational enterprises through their majority owned foreign affiliates,
by industry of affiliate and by country of affiliate.
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shown in Figure 1). Other factors would certainly have an impact on the
rise and fall of Hollywood’s international revenues in Asia, but Hollywood’s
fall appears to be contemporaneous with the rapid growth of China’s film
production. Moreover, Hollywood’s short burst of revenue growth around
2010 is coincident with a Chinese film industry that was still growing, but
not as rapidly.
Services to Foreign Persons:
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 Asia and Pacific
Chinese
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Figure 7: U.S. Motion Picture Services to Foreign Persons
(Africa, Middle East, Asia and Pacific) v. Chinese film production,
rates of change
Note: See note in Figure 6.
Sources: B.E.A. International Services data for services to foreign persons by
U.S. multinational enterprises through their majority owned foreign affiliates,
by industry of affiliate and by country of affiliate.
The predictability of how Hollywood films will perform in China is an-
other key factor in Hollywood’s struggle. The ideal situation for Hollywood
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would be a state of low risk (McMahon, 2015; Nitzan & Bichler, 2009; Wasko,
2008). Some of my past research on risk has used data on the number of open-
ing theatres per film as a proxy to measure the risk perceptions of Hollywood.
Opening-theatre data can function as a proxy because each commitment to
the size of a film’s theatrical release is, essentially, an expectation about its
future revenues. To release in many or few theatres, or to exhibit nation-
wide or start in select citiesthese are just some of the choices that must be
decided well before opening night, before any revenue dollars start flowing.
Without reliable opening-theatre data for the Chinese film market, we can
use American opening-theatre data indirectly. In the contemporary period,
Hollywood has been enjoying a period of low risk in the American market.
An important consequence of this low risk is that there is a strong correlation
between a film’s revenue rank (nth place in largest gross revenues) and its
rank in the largest number of opening theatres (nth place in most opening
theatres) (McMahon, 2013, 2019). Thus, we can see if there is any bene-
ficial transference of this low risk, whereby the films that are top-ranking
the United States would also be top-ranking in foreign markets. If that is
the case, there is an added degree of confidence to giving certain films wide
opening releases.
Figure 8 estimates to what degree the ranking-order of the largest grossing
films in the U.S. market will have similar ranks in Australia, China. France,
Mexico, Japan and South Korea. The x-axis plots the revenue rank of each
film in the top 100 of the American theatrical market. The y-axis plots the
revenue rank of the same set of films in one the six foreign markets. If, for
instance, a film has a rank of 2 in the United States and a rank of 125 in
Japan, the film was, for its year of release, the 2nd highest grossing film in the
United States and the 125th highest grossing film in Japan. The correlation
between the ranks is measured with Spearman’s rank correlation.
Of the six countries, China has the lowest positive correlation between the
U.S. rank and Chinese rank of theatrical releases. Further research would
be needed to explain how Hollywood produces a mirroring effect with an-
other country’s box-office rankings, but strong positive correlations, evident
in countries such as Australia and Mexico, have clear advantages for Hol-
lywood’s major studios. For instance, promotion and advertising are key
factors of a theatrical-distribution strategy (Wasko, 2003), but there can be
high risk if a studio is uncertain how much or how little promotion and adver-
tising is needed for a film to be a big success in foreign market. The benefit in
reducing this type of uncertainty was recently demonstrated in the negative,
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Figure 8: Box-office revenue rank of U.S. top 100, U.S. market v.
foreign, 2007 - 2016
Note: Data on France includes revenues from Algeria, Monaco, Morocco and
Tunisia. Axes are in log10 scale.
Source: boxofficemojo.com for gross revenues of a films in the theatrical
markets of the United States, Australia, France and Algeria, Monaco, Morocco
and Tunisia, China, and Japan.
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when Disney promoted the latest Star Wars films in China. The original Star
Wars films were not previously exhibited in China and its moviegoers did not
grow up in an environment where, for generations of people, the Star Wars
franchise was one of the centerpieces of popular culture. Thus, Disney added
extra doses of promotion in China, but reports indicated that the effects of
the extra promotion were still uncertain. For franchises the size of Star Wars,
there might be few certain substitutes for the knowledge that an entrenched,
dedicated fanbase will very likely make the next film a top-ranking success
(Frater, 2018; Greenberg, 2016).
Figure 8 has China and five other countries for comparison. Availability
of data was a factor in the selection of these countries, but another factor
was the differences in how these countries control the flow of U.S. cultural
imports. Australia, Mexico and South Korea have free-trade agreements with
the U.S. and, as of 2018, China, France and Japan do not. The correlation
between the revenue ranks of films are higher in countries with U.S. free-trade
agreements.
Table 1 selects a few films that contributed to China’s relatively low
correlation. Each of the six films was very successful in the United States
but could not reproduce a similar box-office ranking in China. Because of
our earlier reference to the Star Wars franchise, it is interesting that neither
Star Wars: The Force Awakens nor Rogue One: A Star Wars Story reached
the top ten of China’s annual box-office revenues. Table 2 illustrates that, in
this case, China’s film market is similar to South Korea’s, somewhat similar
to Mexico’s, and dissimilar to the markets of Australia, France and Japan.
Table 1: Comparison of Theatrical Revenues Rankings: Selection of
Films
Film U.S. Rank China Rank
Star Wars: The Force Awakens 1 13
Rogue One: A Star Wars Story 1 36
The Hunger Games: Catching Fire 1 40
Finding Dory 2 53
Shrek the Third 2 59
Inside Out 4 81
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Table 2: Comparison of Theatrical Revenues Rankings: The Star
Wars Franchise
Country The Force Awakens Rogue One
U.S. 1 1
China 13 36
Australia 1 1
France 1 1
Japan 1 9
Mexico 7 24
South Korea 18 48
4 Conclusion
Coming to a definitive conclusion about Hollywood’s position in China is dif-
ficult, because the issue is still open. The United States’ W.T.O. complaint
against China lead to a co-signed Memorandum of Understanding (signed in
2012), but this document was essentially a deferral: it gave China five years
to keep its quota system in place, at which point all parties will begin to
“discuss the matter of China implementing the [WTO Dispute Settlement
Body’s] recommendations and rulings” (WTO, 2012). There are also ways
for Hollywood’s ambitions to be affected by larger issues in Sino-U.S.trade
relations, which has been an on-going news story of Donald Trump’s presi-
dency (Maddaus, 2016; McCoid, 2017; Wolf, 2018). It is beyond the scope of
this paper to predict how the W.T.O. talks will resume or what will become
of America and China’s relationship under Presidents Trump and Xi.
Nevertheless, this paper has analyzed how we have gotten to where we
are now. The Chinese film business has grown under state protection, to a
size that enables its largest film producers and distributors to be formidable
competitors in the Chinese theatrical market. Hollywood films still do well in
China, but American studios are forced to choose from alternatives that each
gives Chinese partners some advantage. If Hollywood exports a film through
the quota system it must give a share of the film revenues to a Chinese
distributor and lose direct control over scheduling. Hollywood must also try
to pass films through the approval process of the Chinese state. Should the
C.C.P. have an issue with a film, there are likely to be added costs and delays
caused by editing or re-shooting.
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Analysts of Hollywood and China identify that the main alternative to the
quota system is co-production with a Chinese studio (Curtin, 2016; O’Connor
& Armstrong, 2015). Co-production appears to be a suitable option because
foreign investment can still take place and Chinese partners can help tailor
stories to the expectations of Chinese audiences. But co-productions with a
Chinese studio are less-than-ideal if Hollywood is not simply a glorified for-
eign investor–i.e., Hollywood’s participation in production is different from
an absentee owner who simply wants a return on Chinese cinema. Hollywood
prefers to export its films to multiple regions around the world, rather than
make a set of films for each region. Hollywood also rarely cedes key pieces of
control to others, such as distribution and licensing rights, final cut, adver-
tising and promotion, scheduling and intellectual property.6While the recent
strategy with China might indicate that Hollywood could alter the ways it
accounts for regional differences in language, culture and politics, Hollyood’s
compromise with C.C.P. policy could put its studios on a slippery-slope. And
is China the only country that can force Hollywood into compromise?
6 From a broader political economic perspective, the difference between Chinese co-
productions and Hollywood’s typical behavior as a global enterprise is a matter of power.
Hollywood does use film labour and production studios all around the world (Curtin,
2016) and post-production of digital media can be done virtually anywhere. However, the
extension of a film production network does not, by itself, transfer or dilute the rights of
private ownership. A major Hollywood studio can have location scouts in London, shoot
in Bulgaria or hire a film crew in Tunisia, but the former’s power remains unchanged
because it has retained ownership of its claim on future income (McMahon, 2015; Nitzan &
Bichler, 2009; Veblen, 2004). This retention of control is why global opportunities to work
on Hollywood film projects are concentrated in location-shooting and post-production;
the costs of these jobs are being cut in the interest of Hollywood, as countries and regions
around the world compete to offer financial incentives, tax breaks and cheap labour (Miller,
Govil, McMurria, Maxwell, & Wang, 2005).
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